That the nature of international security changed fundamentally on a single day is now taken for granted. When those hijacked aircraft were flown into buildings in New York and Washington (and into the ground at Shanksville, Pennsylvania), the catastrophe was to lead, at least in some circles, to a profound change in the ways security was discussed.
envisioning the ‗war on terror', American policy-makers saw a single threat narrative of terrorism, which is why it was possible, in his speech to Congress on 20 September 2001, for President Bush to say: ‗And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.' 1 No-one working on international security and counterterrorism in the UK, in either the policy or the academic community, would have made such a statement in, say, August 2001; terrorism was simply understood differently. But in choosing to respond to the attacks with the political and military strategy of the ‗war on terror', such complexity was removed, and a new, singular threat was put in its place. 2 Americans and Britons understood the threat narrative differently from the very start of the ‗age of terror'. Indeed, that very term-the ‗age of terror'-precisely captures the difference. With a history of atrocity in places as distinct as Birmingham, Guildford, Belfast, Enniskillen, Warrington, Omagh and London (which experienced 14 separate attacks in over 20 years up to the Belfast Agreement, and four more after it), all in the period from the early 1970s to 9/11, the ascription of that title to a new period was, to British and Irish ears, jarring. Americans, though, felt in the wreckage of September 11th a loss of invulnerability, and so ‗age of terror' was precisely the key description in the United States. As Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda put it:
We've never had a good name for it, and now it's over. The post-cold war era-let us call it that for want of any better term-began with the collapse of one structure, the Berlin Wall, on America had declared the new age: and that declaration would structure security and foreign policy for the world. For the UK, that would mean that counterterrorism policy, broadly expressed, would be framed far more by the American agenda that it would be by Britain's own experiences in struggles with terrorists.
With the declaration of the ‗war on terror', focus was trained on the threat narrative to America and the West. But it is the contention of this article that there have been a series of threat narratives; that one of the characteristics of the ‗age of terror' has been our failure at a political and public level to agree on what the threat is. As a consequence, we have failed to agree on the name of the enemy: is it ‗Al-Qaeda', ‗Islamo-fascism', ‗Islamism', ‗Islamic terrorism'? All have been tried and, for different reasons, found wanting as descriptors. We have failed to establish a counterterrorism narrative that would persuasively and over time convincingly show linkages between operations in Iraq, the West Midlands, Afghanistan and Glasgow; and for some British citizens, a counternarrative-of Britain ‗crusading' against the Muslim world-has taken hold. That which constitutes ‗threat' has changed in our minds over the past decade.
This article examines these issues by first looking at four distinct though overlapping notions of the threat posed to the West, and to the UK, in debates about counterterrorism since 9/11. One considered Al-Qaeda to be a central organization, perhaps akin to the Red Army in the Cold War: a military machine conducting hostile operations. Another viewed the threat in network terms, as being decentralized, with a number of local cells operating strategically in common but distinctly in tactical terms.
Yet another focused on the ‗home-grown' threat, in which radicalized young people are drawn into terrorism by ideologues outside mosques or via the internet; here, Al-Qaeda's role could be seen as more analogous to the Comintern in Cold War days. This section will examine how each of the four types of threat identified above was seen. The purpose is not to provide evidence or argument that one or more of these narratives is in any objective sense ‗wrong', nor to assert that the ‗real' nature of terrorism can be understood outside narratives. Rather, the focus in this article is to understand the nature of the contestation about the nature of ‗threat', an issue that has to be absolutely core to any counterterrorism strategy and practice.
AQ Central
The first threat narrative, that emerging from the attacks of 9/11, focused on the idea of a centralized, global terrorist threat: a narrative that strongly underpinned the Bush Administration's response to 9/11. Rather than see the attackers as criminal, they were understood as (illegitimate) soldier-terrorists following the orders of the leader. 
The network threat
Following analysis of the war in Afghanistan in 2001, a strand of thinking developed to suggest that Al-Qaeda was or had become not a centralized structure, but rather a network. Some, such as Alia Brahimi, argued that there had been a transition, from a centralized structure to a network, and that in this transition the seeds of Al-Qaeda's destruction could be found, for the network model would lead to more innocent Muslim deaths at the hands of Al-Qaeda that would not be possible to justify, either ideologically or theologically. For Blair, the ideology and indeed the operation were products of AQ Central.
But for others, the home-grown threat was could not be separated from the network threat. As Roy noted: ‗We have seen that young westerners went to countries to fight the jihad and came back to Europe to commit terrorist acts. But these networks can function both ways, without us being able to talk about a point of departure and a final point.'
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The focus on the movement of people to and from jihadi theatres sheds some light on networks, but it fails to address other elements of threat narratives, especially those focusing on the home-grown nature of the threat.
Of course, it would be strange to suggest that the home-grown threat had no links to other ways of thinking about the threat, such as that of a ‗network'. But it also had distinctive elements. That is, the home-grown threat is not purely derived from a 
The new terrorism threat
One of the particularly noticeable strands of thinking about threat has been a focus on the idea of a ‗new terrorism', and specifically the view that the ‗new terrorists' were fundamentally different in terms of threat from those of the past. Irish terrorism often gave warnings, and was connected to a political strategy. The ‗new terrorists', it was said, simply wanted to kill as many people as possible. And the previous year, he had said: ‗The only path to take is to confront this terrorism, remove it root and branch and at all costs stop them acquiring the weapons to kill on a massive scale because these terrorists would not hesitate to use them.'
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In Britain, the idea that terrorism was ‗new' was very much connected to the fear that it would be apocalyptic. John Reid{?} had said that Britain was facing ‗probably the most sustained period of severe threat since the end of the second world war', and that there was a new ruthless group of ‗unconstrained international terrorists'. 32 The former director of the British Security Service noted shortly before she retired: ‗The terrorist threat from AQ and related groups is, quite simply, unprecedented in scale, ambition and ruthlessness: they have a global reach, and they are willing to carry out mass casualty 386. 36 Crenshaw, "The causes of terrorism", p. 386. 
New and old terrorism
In the late 1990s a burgeoning literature emerged which sought to address aspects of what was labelled as ‗new' terrorism, drawing attention to a new phase, or a radically altered form of threat. 37 Martha Crenshaw has argued that the literature on ‗new' terrorism assumes that the means of this terrorism are radically different; that its goals or ends are ‗presumed to be both unlimited and non-negotiable'; and that accounts of it are predicated on a reading of ‗decentralised, -inspirational‖ and ‗diffuse' threats, rather than a phenomenon orchestrated by an orthodox entity or organization. 38 Crenshaw notes that the effect of 9/11 had a huge impact, akin to the North Korean invasion of South Korea, inasmuch as it cemented ‗the ideas behind interpretations of threat' which at the time were focused on ‗Communism and the militarisation of containment'. 39 She further notes that the ‗1998 embassy bombings, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, and the millennium plots strengthened the perception of a completely new threat'. 40 Crenshaw recognizes that the idea of new terrorism is appealing, but judges it deeply flawed in its assumptions. In effect, it ‗is a way of defining the threat so as to mobilise both public and Ian Lesser, Countering the new terrorism (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999). 38 Martha Crenshaw, ""New" vs. "old" terrorism: a critical appraisal", in Coolsaet, Jihadi terrorism and the radicalisation challenge in Europe, pp. 25-36. 39 Crenshaw, ""New" vs. "old" terrorism", p. 35.
elite support for costly responses with long-term and uncertain pay-offs'. 41 The ‗shock' of 9/11 was a turning point, and the narrative of ‗new terrorism' led to a model which ‗permits top-down processing of information' precisely because policy-makers ‗rely on metaphors, narratives and analogies that make sense of what otherwise {?} be difficult to understand, if not incomprehensible'. 42 While this is certainly the case, it is interesting to note that much of the work on ‗new terrorism' predates the events of 9/11, and this recognition leads to a number of questions: and between individuals and groups' which leads to ‗interactivity'. 43 For Sageman, it is this interactivity which is novel, transformative and perhaps even revolutionary, when considering contemporary terror threats. He notes that the ‗the intensity of feelings developed online rival those developed offline'. 44 Computer-mediated communication ‗seems to collapse time and eliminate space' and ‗has the potential to transform human relationships faster and to an even greater degree', a point illustrated by the fact that ‗some networks were created wholesale from forums, which radicalized their members'. 45 The use of information and communication technologies and the associated electronic networks became a central strategic tool of Al-Qaeda, differentiating it from earlier phases of terrorism. 46 Groups and networks can raise and even construct awareness about the plight and suffering of peoples in different parts of the world, particularly through videos which can be streamed online. This has led to the creation of new patterns of recruitment-both
The shift in the coverage of events from the print media and television to digital media has transformed the context in which terrorism and insurgencies, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are understood and analysed. 47 One outcome has been a return to discussions about ‗the terrain of the electronic media . . . the kind of immediacy and visual impact you get from television'. 48 To an even greater extent, the shift from the 
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It is unusual in a violent conflict to be unclear as to the nature of the threat faced.
But perhaps some of that uncertainty is rooted in the times-that is, the novelty characteristic of the digital age, which facilitates broader globalized patterns of empathy and action, of information and self-radicalization, and, of course, through mobile communications technology, facilitates new opportunities for operational activity by violent groups. Five years after 7/7, these reflections on the evolution of counterterrorism-and its close cousin counterinsurgency-may lead to radical reconsiderations of the age of terror and the evolution of threat narratives.
Conclusion
The analysis and arguments in this paper have been split into two broad sections. The first has charted the evolution of different, indeed overlapping, threat narratives, which have variously been deployed to demarcate not only the boundaries of the ‗age of terror' but also western policy responses. In particular, we have drawn attention to the ways in which these stories about threat interpenetrate, producing an evolving discourse about the 
